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1  Introduction 
The sovereign debt crisis in the euro area during the spring of 2010 has revealed that the 
monetary  and  fiscal  policy  framework  of  the  European  Monetary  Union  (EMU)  is  still 
incomplete. Obviously, the rules-based framework for fiscal policy created by the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact was insufficient to prevent a debt crisis 
despite its emphasis on keeping public sector deficits low and strengthening forward-looking 
budgetary planning. Moreover, once the crisis occurred and financial markets were agitated 
by it, it became obvious that EMU did not have policy tools to manage and resolve the crisis. 
In the end, the European Union responded to the crisis first by agreeing on stabilisation for 
Greece and then by creating the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) that succeeded in 
calming the markets. However, these responses were developed in an ad-hoc manner and 
on a temporary basis only and do not provide a sufficient basis for dealing with any possible 
future debt crises in the euro area. 
Several proposals have been put forward for how to improve the euro area’s capacity to deal 
with problems of excessive public debts. In order to prevent sovereign crises, the European 
Commission (2010) has proposed a number of measures to strengthen the Excessive Deficit 
Procedure and the Stability and Growth Pact. These proposals focus mainly on making the 
rules of the current framework more effective and on strengthening their enforcement by 
introducing stiffer and more automatic penalties for violating these rules. The European 
Central Bank (ECB) has made proposals (2010) going in the same direction and, at the same 
time, has called for the creation of a crisis management fund for the euro area, which would 
come into play if the strengthening of the rules-based framework does not suffice to prevent 
future debt crises. According to the ECB’s proposal, such a fund should provide ‘last-resort 
financing’  at  penalty  rates  to  governments  facing  difficulties  in  accessing  private  credit 
markets.  
It is, however, the German government that has most forcefully argued for the creation of 
an orderly default mechanism for euro-area member states, partly as a condition for making 
the  EFSF  permanent.  Following  a  French-German  agreement  on  18  October  to  create  a 
‘permanent and robust framework to ensure orderly crisis management in the future’, the 
European Council of 28-29 October 2010 stated that ‘Heads of State or Government agree 
on the need for Member States to establish a permanent crisis mechanism to safeguard the 
financial stability of the euro area as a whole and invite the President of the European 
Council to undertake consultations with the members of the European Council on a limited 
treaty change required to that effect’ (European Council, 2010). There are also reports that 
the German finance ministry is preparing a proposal for coordinating the demands of bond 
holders in a sovereign debt crisis and imposing ‘haircuts’ on the face value of the debt of a 
government in financial distress.  2 
 
 
Outside official circles, there have been several plans along similar lines, most notably by 
Gros and Mayer (2010) who proposed the creation of a European Monetary Fund aimed at 
both improving crisis prevention and financing a mechanism for sovereign debt resolution.  
We agree that the euro area needs a mechanism for dealing with sovereign debt crises in an 
effective and predictable way. Even the most sophisticated and most effectively enforced set 
of fiscal rules will not eliminate the possibility of future debt crises in the euro area. One of 
the main problems of the crisis of 2010 was clearly that policymakers had no game plan for 
dealing  with  it.  The  absence  of  any  rules  guiding  market  expectations  about  how 
governments and the Commission would respond to the crisis contributed to the volatility of 
financial markets during the crisis and this, in turn, contributed to the sense of urgency 
policymakers felt about the need to act. 
We propose in this paper the creation of a European Crisis Resolution Mechanism (ECRM) 
consisting of two pillars: 
  A procedure to initiate and conduct negotiations between a sovereign debtor with 
unsustainable debt and its creditors leading to, and enforcing, an agreement on how 
to  reduce  the  present  value
1  of  the  debtor’s  future  obligations  in  order  to  re-
establish the sustainability of its public finances. This would require a special court to 
deal with such cases. The European Court of Justice is the natural institution for this 
purpose and a special chamber could be created within it for that purpose. 
  Rules for the provision of financial assistance to euro-area countries as an element in 
resolving the crisis. Should a euro-area country be found insolvent, the provision of 
financial aid should be conditional on the achievement of an agreement between the 
debtor  and  the  creditors  reestablishing  solvency.  The  task  of  supplying  financial 
assistance could be given to the EFSF provided that it is made permanent and an 
institution of the European Union. Lending by the permanent EFSF could also be 
provided,  under  appropriate  conditions,  to  euro  area  countries  facing  temporary 
liquidity problems, as currently foreseen by the temporary EFSF.  
The ECRM would have to balance the interests of the debtor and its lenders and to keep 
moral hazard problems on both sides to a minimum. Thus, it must not be too lenient to 
governments  in  order  not  to  create  any  incentive  to  borrow  at  unsustainable  levels. 
Guaranteeing last-resort financing alone would not do that because the threat of imposing 
high penalty rates, which would lead to a further deterioration of the sustainability of public 
finances, is not credible in a crisis.  
                                                            
1 This is usually called ‘debt restructuring’ as opposed to ‘debt rescheduling’ which consists of amending the 
timetable of repayments without changing their present value. 3 
 
 
The ECRM must also not be too lenient to private creditors, as the current response to the 
crisis has been, in order not to create incentives to lend to governments without careful 
regard to the state of their public finances. In fact, one of the main benefits of creating an 
ECRM would be the public acknowledgement that the default of a government on its debt is 
a real possibility in the euro area. This, along with necessary changes in financial regulation 
and  supervision,  would  prompt  creditors  to  differentiate  among  sovereign  debt  issuers, 
thereby strengthening market discipline and helping prevent further debt crises. At the same 
time, however, the ECRM must help both the debtor and its creditors to recognise when 
debt  is  unsustainable  and  to  prevent  financial  market  turmoil  and  costly  delay  in 
restructuring.  
The creation of the ECRM would likely need to be established by a treaty. The mechanism 
would, therefore, only apply to future debt issuance.  
 
   4 
 
 
2  Why the euro area needs a mechanism for sovereign-debt default  
Sovereign defaults have been a fact of life throughout history. Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer 
(2006) show that, among the member states of the euro area, Austria, Greece, Germany, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain have each experienced at least one case of sovereign default since 
1824. Most of these defaults occurred during the Gold Standard. This is significant, because 
the Gold Standard, like membership of the euro area, implied that a national government 
could not revert to high inflation to rid itself of an excessive debt burden except by leaving 
the Gold Standard, at least temporarily. Germany alone has defaulted on its sovereign debt 
three times in the past 100 years (Kratzmann, 1982; Waldhoff, 2004). Thus, even if  the 
possibility of sovereign defaults is generally not provided for in national legal frameworks for 
default and insolvency, it cannot be denied (Hattenhauer, 2000).
2  
In a monetary union, sovereign default is an even more relevant issue than in a monetary  
regime of national currencies because member states’ lack of monetary policy autonomy. 
This situation was recognised in the early discussions on EMU and provides the essential 
rationale for the prohibition of co-responsibility for public debt (Article 125 of the treaty) 
and the prevention of excessive deficits (Article 126, upon which the Stability and Growth 
Pact is based). The greater possibility of sovereign default in a monetary union is just the 
dark side of the well-known argument that highly indebted countries benefit from euro-area 
membership in terms of lower interest rates paid on their public debt because the monetary 
union  makes  the  commitment  to  low  inflation  more  credible.  By  closing  the  inflation 
channel,  monetary  union  leaves  a  country  with  only  three  ways  out  of  a  situation  of 
excessive debt: severe and harmful fiscal retrenchment, default, and being bailed out by the 
other members of the monetary union. The bail-outs of the German states of Bremen and 
Saarland by the Federal Republic of Germany in the early 1990s are recent examples of the 
latter option. Furthermore, countries with excessive public-debt ratios may also suffer from 
an overvalued real exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro partners. This is likely to make restoring 
price competitiveness and reducing the debt burden two conflicting objectives. 
From an economics perspective, there is no reason to believe that a debt crisis or the default 
of an individual euro-area member state on its public debt would put the price stability of 
the euro at risk. The euro’s internal price stability is not threatened because, as long as the 
ECB does not monetise public debt and deficits directly, a government’s access to private 
credit has no implications for the money supply and, hence, for inflation in the euro area.
3  
                                                            
2 Germany’s Constitutional Court has explicitly recognised the state’s right to free itself from an excessive debt 
burden by means of declaring bankruptcy (Waldhoff, 2004). 
3 Proponents of the fiscal theory of the price level argue that inflation is driven by the growth of the public 
sector’s  total  nominal  liabilities,  not  just  money.  If  so,  a  sovereign  default  would  alleviate  inflationary 
pressures. 5 
 
 
By  the  same  token  it  could  be  argued  that  the  euro’s  external  stability  would  not  be 
threatened by the default of one of the participating countries. No one worried about the 
stability of the US dollar when the City of New York filed for bankruptcy in 1975, nor when 
Orange County did so in the early 1990s, and no one seems worried about the stability of the 
US dollar despite the current fiscal crisis of California, although California is a significant part 
of  the  US  economy.  As  discussed  in  section  4,  however,  the  default  of  a  medium-sized 
member would be a more significant financial event for the euro area in view of the debt 
levels and the concentration of holdings in the euro area. Financial stability concerns would 
be likely to enter into play.  
It is true, however, that the 2010 euro-area sovereign-debt crisis created much volatility in 
euro financial markets, causing large movements in bond yields and in the euro’s exchange 
rate with other currencies. This volatility was the result of the markets’ uncertainty about 
whether or not the other euro-area member states and perhaps the ECB were willing to help 
the Greek government financially and, if not, what would happen in the case of a Greek 
default on the country’s sovereign debt. At some stage markets even seemed to fear that, if 
not properly handled, the Greek crisis could ultimately lead to the demise of the euro.    
From  the  point  of  view  of  individual  bond  holders,  there  are  three  relevant  sources  of 
uncertainty associated with sovereign-debt problems, two that are general and one which is 
specific to the euro area:  
  Uncertainty about the willingness and ability of a distressed government to honour its 
financial liabilities; 
  Uncertainty about the behaviour of other bond holders; and 
  Uncertainty  about  the  extent  of  financial  assistance  from  other  euro-area  member 
states, the EU as a whole, and the ECB. 
The first type of uncertainty is embedded in all borrower-lender relationships. In the case of 
public debt it is aggravated by the fact that the main asset of a sovereign debtor is its power 
and capacity to tax, which is intangible in nature (Hattenhauer, 2000). The economic value of 
this asset depends on the degree of hardship a country’s citizens are willing to bear in order 
to service its debt and on the government’s administrative capacity to raise revenues (ie on 
the primary surpluses the government is able to achieve) and is, therefore, largely an issue 
of political judgment. The uncertainty surrounding it implies that market expectations can 
change  drastically  with  the  arrival  of  even  small  amounts  of  new  information.  Looming 
behind this uncertainty is the classic borrower-lender moral-hazard problem: an organised 
bankruptcy offers the possibility for a government to free itself from a large debt burden by 6 
 
 
defaulting on its domestic and/or foreign debt. This may be more attractive than servicing 
the debt, a possibility foreseen already by Adam Smith (Waldhoff, 2004; Kratzmann, 1982).
4 
The second type of uncertainty relates to two classic coordination problems among creditors 
in the case of a default. The first one occurs  ex ante, ie before a sovereign default (or bail-
out) has been declared, and consists of the risk of a ‘creditor grab race’, in which individual 
creditors rush to sell off their bonds or refuse early to roll over a given stock of debt, leading 
to a decline in bond prices, and causing other creditors to behave in the same way (Thomas, 
2004). If declining bond prices make potential lenders shy away from the market and refuse 
to roll over a country’s debt, this may aggravate a financial problem to the point of triggering 
a crisis that might otherwise have been avoided.  
The other coordination problem is the ex-post risk of a ‘hold-out’, in which a minority of the 
bondholders - including possibly a ‘vulture fund’ having bought some of the distressed debt 
at low prices - refuses to agree to the restructuring of a country’s debt in the hope of being 
bought out in full by the majority. Assume that a highly indebted country needs a cut in its 
debt burden by, say, 30 percent in order to secure servicing of the remaining debt, and that 
a majority of the creditors agrees that this is better than losing all their money. A minority- 
group of creditors might then ask the rest - possibly with the help of a court - to pay them 
out in full in order to agree to the settlement. Rogue or vulture creditors of this type may 
prevent a settlement that is in the collective interest of the creditors in order to maximise 
their joint payoff. 
The third type of uncertainty is specific to European Monetary Union and results from the 
tension between the principle of solidarity that binds the union members together on the 
one hand and the principle that each member, as a sovereign state, is responsible for its own 
finances on the other. Before the recent crisis, the common reading of Article 125 of the 
treaty was that it ruled out the possibility of a bail-out of an EU member state by other 
member states or by the European Union, hence its alias: ‘no-bail-out clause’. Without the 
strong affirmation of this principle, it would have been hard, if not impossible, to persuade 
Germany to join the euro area. 
5,6  
During the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, public statements by leading policymakers in the euro 
area and the EU Commission affirmed the principle of solidarity and the possibility of helping 
                                                            
4 As Rogoff (1999) notes, it is not easy to answer the question why sovereign debtors ever repay their debts. 
5 See eg the 1993 ruling of the German Constitutional  Court on the Maastricht Treaty, which argued that 
monetary union was based on the concept of a union of stability. Should this stability not be maintained, the 
monetary union would no longer remain within the bounds of its treaty base. 
6 There is, however, some disagreement concerning the precise meaning of Article 125. The term ‘bail-out’ as 
such is not used in the treaty. What the treaty says is that no country or EU entity can assume responsibility for 
a member country’s public debt. This no-co-responsibility principle is arguably different from a no-assistance 
principle (Marzinotto, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 2010) and this is the reason why it is claimed that assistance to 
Greece could be provided without being at odds with the treaty.    
 7 
 
 
Greece or other distressed governments solve their debt problems. In the absence of any 
rules or procedures other than ‘no bail-out’ and without any clear vision of what a sovereign 
default  would  look  like  and  what  its  effects  on  the  euro  would  be,  policymakers  first 
procrastinated for months, with some insisting on the principle of no bail-out, and others 
affirming solidarity. This left markets guessing whether or not the EU as a whole, the euro-
area member states, or the ECB would provide financial support to distressed governments. 
Again, any small piece of news was enough to move interest rates and exchange rates. In the 
end, the governments reverted to emergency packages that were put together in a hurry 
and left many questions open. The risk of collapse of the euro and the associated sense of 
urgency proves that a no-bail-out clause with no rules for how a default of a euro-area 
member state would evolve is not credible because, when crisis strikes, governments look 
for options to prevent a default. To simply refuse to assist Greece would not have been 
credible anyway since the country was still a member of the IMF and as such was entitled to 
receive international assistance with or without European assistance. 
A sovereign-debt restructuring mechanism seeks as far as possible to avoid the second and 
third types of uncertainty while minimising the first type of uncertainty and the attendant 
moral hazard problem for the debtor governments. Sovereign-debt resolution involves a 
combination of fiscal adjustments by the defaulting government on the one hand and, on 
the other, cutting the amount of debt outstanding, prolonging the maturity of the remaining 
debt and reducing the interest paid on it. Its main purpose is to return the debtor-country 
back to a state of sustainable public finances. At the same time, it aims at a fair distribution 
of the cost of restructuring between the borrower and the creditors.  
To avoid market turmoil, a debt-restructuring mechanism must guide market expectations 
effectively about the steps that will be taken in the resolution of a debt crisis and their likely 
outcomes.  At  the  same  time,  it  must  provide  policymakers  with  a  game  plan  for  such 
situations  and,  in  the  case  of  EMU  countries,  resolve  the  credibility  problem  of  the 
unconditional no-bail-out clause. This latter aspect is new in international monetary and 
financial relations, though not in the context of federal states. Furthermore, the mechanism 
must set clear rules for involving the creditors in the crisis resolution, which would give 
creditors stronger incentives to care about the credit worthiness of sovereign debtors ex 
ante and thereby strengthen market discipline. 
In past international sovereign-debt crises, resolutions were managed by the Paris Club and 
the  London  Club.  The  Paris  Club  brings  together  defaulting  sovereign  debtors  and  their 
sovereign lenders to negotiate a solution, while the London Club brings together defaulting 
sovereign debtors and their international bankers. Neither of these institutions is suited to 
sovereign-debt problems in the euro area, since most of the outstanding public debt in the 
euro area is in the form of government bonds rather than bank loans or intergovernmental 
credit. Hence a new institutional solution has to be found. 8 
 
 
It is sometimes argued that contingency planning is unnecessary, if not harmful, and that a 
pragmatic solution will be found if and when the problem arises. The lessons from the 2010 
crisis, however, are that it can take a long time to reach an agreement and that delays 
involve costs: while policymakers negotiate, markets speculate about the probability, nature 
and depth of a compromise. To rely once again on improvisation to find a solution would 
involve significant risks for the stability of the euro area. Furthermore, the question raises 
fundamental issues about the principles that underpin Economic and Monetary Union, on 
which ambiguity should not be allowed to prevail.      
Currently, only the US has a formal, explicit bankruptcy procedure for government entities - 
Chapter  9 of  the  US  Bankruptcy Code  -  which  applies  to  municipalities.
7  Chapter 9 was 
created during the Great Depression, when a number of local governments were unable to 
service their debts. However the US has no formal procedure for default by states. 
8,9  
Earlier  in this decade,  the  IMF presented a proposal for a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
Mechanism  (Krueger,  2002;  Rogoff  and  Zettelmeyer,  2002a,  b)  to  deal  with  defaults  of 
developing and emerging market countries, which is discussed in detail in the next section.     
   
                                                            
7 For an overview of Chapter 9 and its main properties, see Raffer (1990). 
8 The reason why there is no formal procedure in the U S for state default is that states have  ‘sovereign 
immunity’, which means that they cannot be sued. This does not imply, however, that states cannot be in a 
position where they are unable to service their debts. This would happen if a state were unable to borrow. In 
such an event, the federal government would step in and put the state in question into receivership, a situation 
which has never occurred in the history of the US, partly because most states have statutory balanced budget 
requirements.   
9  Germany has an implicit procedure for debt crises of individual states resulting from the rulings of the 
constitutional  court in the cases of Saarland, Bremen and Berlin. Accordingly, a state has a right to  the 
solidarity of the federation if it finds itself in a situation of budgetary emergency. In its Berlin ruling, the  court 
made it clear that, as long as a state has size able marketable assets (such as public housing), such a situation 
does not exist. 9 
 
 
3 - Past attempts to create a sovereign-debt restructuring mechanism 
After the Mexican crisis of 1994-5, the attention of the international community turned to 
the problem of unsustainable sovereign debt.
10 At that time, the Mexican assistance package 
was the largest in history, and was supported with resou rces from the IMF and from the 
US
11. The policy and academic communities reacted to the magnitude of support needed, 
and discussions and proposals were put forth to try to avoid the need for a similar bail-out in 
the future.
12  
Until the l980s, most sovereign debt had been owed either to official lenders (in which case 
the Paris Club could deal with it) or to private banks (of which a relatively small number held 
a large fraction of the debt). In the Mexican crisis of 1994, by contrast, much of the 
sovereign  debt  had  been  issued  in  the  form  of  bonds  (especially  the  dollar -indexed 
tesobonos, ie short-term government obligations whose value in pesos was linked to the US 
dollar). After much discussion, in 1996, the official sector through the G10 issued a  report 
(Rey, 1996) recommending that Collective Action Clauses (CACs) be  inserted in sovereign- 
debt bonds to facilitate sovereign-debt restructuring when necessary. CACs, it was argued, 
would enable bond holders of a given class to vote and to accept a r estructuring offer if at 
least a specified percentage were in favour. An affirmative vote at or above the specified 
level would then bind all other holders of that class of bonds to accept the offer.
13 
There was also, in the mid 1990s, a discussion of  ‘private sector involvement’ (PSI). Many 
raised questions as to why the official sector should be largely, or solely, responsible for 
‘bailing out’ sovereign borrowers. Instead, it was argued that private creditors had to be 
‘bailed in’. PSI was the official response and was incorporated into IMF policy, to the effect 
that, in the event of crises in which official (especially IMF) money was used, private lenders 
should contribute to (be ‘involved in’) crisis resolution. In the event, it proved difficult to 
achieve meaningful private-sector involvement. When IMF lending was directed to financial 
support in an effort to head off a crisis (by providing enough support so that private lenders 
would be reassured and be willing to roll over loans and perhaps provide new money), the 
very fear that the official sector would attempt to require private lenders to roll over debt 
and/or extend additional credits was likely to drive private lenders to reduce or eliminate 
                                                            
10 In the early 1980s, a large number of sovereign debtors encountered debt servicing difficulties after they had 
borrowed  in  the  1970s  (to  finance  current-account  deficits  after  the  oil  price  increases)  and  then  were 
confronted with large increases in interest rates on their debt. That debt was mostly to banks and the issue was 
not resolved until the Brady Plan, enabling restructuring of debt, was put forward in the late 1980s. Growth 
was very slow, if positive at all, until debt was restructured. 
11 The IMF portion was $30 billion and the US commitment was $20 billion. The US portion was never drawn. 
12 There was  much literature on the subject during that period. For a review, s ee Rogoff and Zettelmeyer 
(2002b). For a later survey, focusing primarily on the empirical literature since the Argentine debt crisis, see 
Panizza, Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2009).  
13 Embodying procedures to deal  with insolvency in debt contracts is referred to as the ‘contractual’ approach, 
and is distinguished from the ‘statutory’ approach, in which procedures spelled out in domestic or international 
law would be followed and bind the parties. 10 
 
 
their exposure before such a requirement was set. It would simultaneously precipitate the 
very phenomenon the IMF was trying to help the debtor to avoid. PSI did not, therefore, 
prove very useful as a tool of crisis avoidance or resolution. 
Resistance  and  objections  to  CACs  were  raised  in  many  quarters.  The  private  financial 
community in particular vehemently rejected the proposal. No action was taken and the 
issue was therefore dropped.  
The Russian and Asian crises of 1997-98 were primarily the result of private, rather than 
sovereign, debt, and the problem of how to handle sovereign-debt crises did not appear 
central to the issues raised by those crises. Thus, as of 2000, the international community’s 
tools for addressing sovereign debt were effectively little changed from what they had been 
twenty years earlier, despite the fact that a much greater share of sovereign debt was in the 
form of bonds and that, on average, these debts had risen considerably as a percent of GDP 
in the borrowing countries.  
As already discussed in section 2, one of the earlier concerns about sovereign debt had been 
the ‘market failure’ that resulted when creditors began to doubt the ability of the sovereign 
to sustain debt-servicing commitments. Whichever creditors were able to get out first would 
generally  experience  smaller,  or  even  no,  losses  compared  to  the  losses  that  would  be 
incurred by those who continued holding their debt instruments and were more loyal to the 
sovereign: the result could be a self-fulfilling panic and a rush to the exit. Since this could 
involve unwillingness to roll over existing debt, as well as to extend any new credits, it would 
bring about a crisis even if the longer-term outlook was not so unfavourable. Moreover, as 
sovereign debt spreads would rise in the secondary market, there was a risk that vultures 
would buy up some of the distressed debt at very low prices, but then hold out for full 
repayment  and  refuse  to  agree  to  a  restructuring.  This,  in  turn,  could  discourage  the 
sovereign from seeking to restructure debt, and leave other creditors reluctant to agree to a 
restructuring if the existence of hold-outs were suspected or known.  
A rogue creditor (Elliot Associates) in fact succeeded, in 1996, in buying Peruvian debt at a 
heavy  discount  prior  to  a  Peruvian  restructuring  and  in  receiving  full  face  value,  as  the 
Peruvian  government  was  willing  to  compensate  the  hold-out  in  order  to  complete  the 
restructuring effort. 
The Peruvian case led to a resumption of interest in problems associated with sovereign 
debt, and in what should be done in case of crisis. Almost all agreed that the existing state of 
affairs  was  unsatisfactory,  and  that  some  form  of  framework  for  sovereign-debt 
restructuring was warranted when sovereign debt was truly unsustainable. 
But the motivation for seeking a framework to avoid vulture funds was different from the 
motivation of those seeking PSI. The latter group (in which European voices were prominent) 
sought  to  reduce  the  financial  burden  on  the  official  sector  when  sovereign  debt  crises 11 
 
 
arose, and to reduce the magnitude of IMF lending needed. The former wanted to prevent 
vultures from profiting so much and delaying restructuring efforts. 
Yet a third motivation for supporting an SDRM lay in the view that uncertainties regarding 
the likely behaviour of creditors during the period of restructuring would deter the sovereign 
from seeking it. This, in turn, would make the costs of truly unsustainable debt needlessly 
higher than they had to be. Opponents of the SDRM, however, especially in the private 
sector,  argued  that  there  should  be  no  reduction  in  costs  of  default  or  restructuring. 
Proponents of SDRM countered that the  delays prior to facing the  inevitable were very 
costly, and that there was more on the table for creditors and debtors when necessary 
restructurings were undertaken promptly and in an orderly fashion.
14 
It  was  evident  to  all  that  there  could  be  instances  in  which  sovereign  debt  was 
unsustainable. Some thought the contractual approach, of which CACs were one possibility, 
held sufficient promise. Others sought an international mechanism (there had been earlier 
proposals) to resolve unsustainable debts, along the lines of a bankruptcy mechanism in 
domestic law. 
The IMF’s SDRM proposal 
The  proposal  was  first  put  forth  in  2001,  and  evolved  in  response  to  reactions  and 
discussions.
15 The proposal always envisaged that the SDRM would be treaty-based, so that 
all IMF members would adhere to its provisions.  
Initially,  it  was  proposed  that  the  IMF  would  need  to  approve  the  activation  of  the 
mechanism, but this provision was later omitted in response to concerns that the IMF would 
have too much power.
16  The  mechanism  would  put  a  stay  on  creditors’  claims,  thus 
preventing  vultures  or  others  from  pursuing  legal  action  and  posing  an  obstacle  to 
restructuring. 
In addition to the binding of all IMF members to the legal provisions of the mechanism, the 
chief difference with the collective action clauses (CAC) proposals was and is that the SDRM 
would have enabled aggregation across all creditors’ claims, in contrast with CACs which 
                                                            
14  The  Argentine  situation  was  headline  news  during  the  period  in  which  the  SDRM  proposal  was  being 
discussed. In that situation, real GDP had been falling every year after 1996, and by the beginning of 2001 it 
seemed evident to all that restructuring would have to occur. Whether the existence of an SDRM would have 
led the authorities to act more quickly is, of course, a hypothetical question. 
15 The final proposal was tabled at the IMF (2003). 
16 The rationale for proposing the need for IMF approval was the concern that the mechanism might be 
activated by a debtor whose debt was sustainable. After discussion, however, it was concluded that there were 
sufficient disincentives to do this so that IMF approval would not be needed. A concern throughout the 
discussions, however, was that the  design of the mechanism should not enable debtors to obtain additional 
leverage in debt restructuring negotiations   but  rather that such negotiations could be undertaken more 
promptly and in a more orderly fashion. 12 
 
 
apply only to individual bond classes.
17 This would have prevented holders of an individual 
bond issue from blocking a settlement (and avoided any risk that a creditor might acquire 
enough of an asset class to block a restructuring).
18 Creditors’ agreement on restructurings 
would  then  have  been  based  on  a  vote  for  approval  by  a  specified  percentage  of  all 
creditors, and would not require the specified majority in each individual class. 
There were other significant differences with CACs. The debtor would have been required to 
provide detailed information as to its indebtedness and its intentions as to how to address it. 
Negotiations would have been undertaken through a representative creditors committee.  
It was envisaged that the IMF would continue to play its role in provision of short-term 
financial support for debtor countries when that support would enable more rapid recovery 
for the debtor and thereby provide a promise of a larger primary surplus and ability to pay. 
The Fund’s concern with ‘lending into arrears’ only when it was determined that the country 
was making good-faith efforts to restructure was to continue. 
The  SDRM  was  proposed  as  a  mechanism  that  would  provide  greater  predictability  and 
timeliness  to  restructuring  of  truly  unsustainable  debt  than  would  otherwise  have  been 
possible. It was anticipated that this predictability and timeliness, in turn, would enable 
debtors and creditors more easily to restructure ‘in the shadow of the law’, as happens in 
some domestic bankruptcies, and simultaneously speed up the debtor’s recognition of the 
need for action and hence the restructuring process when debt was truly unsustainable, 
without changing the balance of leverage between creditors and debtors. 
The debate on the SDRM proposal 
In the case of the IMF’s SDRM proposal, the differing concerns of creditors and debtors were 
a major basis for disagreement and dissent, but there were also elements of misinformation.  
Turning first to different interests, the private financial community (obviously a creditor) was 
firmly opposed to an SDRM (as it had been to the CAC proposal in 1996), believing that such 
a mechanism would overly strengthen debtor rights.
19  
Throughout  the  debate  about  the  SDRM  much  was  made,  both  by  some  creditor 
governments and by  the private financial community, of the argument that an SDRM 
mechanism would give too much power to the IMF and would put it in a conflict -of-interest 
                                                            
17 Disputes inevitably arise between creditors and debtors as to the validity and the aggregation of claims. 
Sorting these out is a technical matter, and it was proposed that there be a Dispute Resolution Forum whose 
members would have expertise in the area, and who would resolve such disputes. This was not controversial. 
18 Aggregation across asset classes must happen in all restructurings: liabilities of different maturities must be 
accelerated and appropriately weighted. But an SDRM could have provided principles and rules for such 
aggregation, thereby reducing uncertainty for creditors and debtors alike.  
19 If a sovereign with unsustainable debt could achieve debt restructuring, an important question would be the 
percentage of the ‘haircut’ (ie the reduction in the face value of the debt) that would be permitted. Creditors 
clearly feared that an SDRM would reduce IMF lending to an extent that their payback would be smaller. 13 
 
 
position, as it is itself a (privileged) creditor. This particular line of attack failed to recognise 
the tight link (despite inevitable uncertainty) between IMF ‘conditionality’ and the future 
path  of  the  primary  surplus.  Lowering  projected  fiscal  deficits  and  undertaking  policy 
reforms  that  could  raise  prospective  growth  rates  would  enable  smaller  haircuts  during 
restructuring than would be necessary in the absence of those measures.  
The IMF in fact altered its proposal to reduce its power in any restructuring. But it remained 
incontrovertible that IMF resources would in almost all cases be needed in the short run and 
that  IMF  conditionality  would  be  important  in  determining  the  future  trajectory  of  the 
primary surplus.   
There was also ambivalence among countries that were prospective borrowers from the 
IMF. Many recognised that an SDRM could reduce the costs of a sovereign-debt crisis, should 
one arise, but at the same time feared that IMF financing to avoid such an outcome would 
be less likely. 
The  European  desire  for  bail-outs  of  smaller  magnitude  gave  some  credence  to  those 
concerned with the future size of IMF lending in crisis situations, but ignored the central role 
of debt unsustainability in bringing about crises, when additional lending to the country 
would not help (except insofar as interest paid on loans was lowered). But, equally, it was 
highly  unrealistic  to  think  that  an  SDRM  mechanism  would  obviate  the  need  for  Fund 
resources. 
Beyond these general concerns, four arguments played important roles in the discussion. 
First,  uncertainty  about  how  much  of  a  haircut  would  be  agreed,  and  how  it  would  be 
decided, was certainly a major factor leading to resistance and opposition to the proposal. It 
is arguable, however, that this uncertainty was always present until the size of the future 
primary surpluses was determined. In fact, as already seen, if a sovereign held unsustainable 
debt, the sustainable level of debt would of necessity be determined by the net present 
value of the primary surpluses the sovereign would incur in the future.
20 
The second argument used against the SDRM proposal was that privat e markets could, of 
themselves, resolve debt issues, and that an SDRM mechanism was not  ‘market-friendly’.  
The  reasoning  behind  this  assertion  was  not  spelled  out.  The  counterargument,  that 
bankruptcy mechanisms are essential parts of commercial codes if private markets are to 
function reasonably efficiently, was not addressed. The débâcle of Argentina’s delayed and 
                                                            
20 The primary surplus is the value of resources (normally expressed as a percentage of GDP) left over in the 
sovereign’s budget for servicing principal and interest on the debt. Clearly, the sustainable level of debt is equal 
to the discounted value (the present value) of these future payments. The role of the IMF was always to work 
with the authorities on budgets in order to programme a feasible primary surplus. 14 
 
 
confused debt restructuring certainly provided at least one important instance in which the 
private market was not at all effective in handling a debt restructuring.
21 
To the argument that the private market could handle restructuring, proponents of the 
SDRM answered that there was nothing in the SDRM proposal that would prevent that from 
continuing to happen. Indeed, restructuring could always take place between creditors and 
debtors and, just like a good bankruptcy mechanism, such an outcome could occur  ‘in the 
shadow of the law’ without recourse to a legal process. 
Third, the argument was made that the presence of the SDRM mechanism would induce 
sovereigns to seek to restructure debt rather than trying to repay it, thus increasing the 
likelihood of default. This seemed to be  a view  held  in some, if not most, parts of the 
financial community. To this, proponents of the SDRM had two counterarguments. They 
responded that creditors would in fact receive more if restructuring - when necessary - could 
be  undertaken  sooner,  as  the  losses  incurred  during  the  run-up  to  the  inevitable 
restructuring  would  be  smaller.  They  also  insisted  that  the  pain  of  restructuring  was 
sufficiently great so that sovereigns would not willingly undertake it unless debt was truly 
unsustainable: the problem was that sovereigns waited far too long, not that they eagerly 
defaulted on their debts. 
The fourth and final argument, which was based neither on differing interests of creditor and 
debtor  nor  on  misinformation,  was  the  proposition  that  CACs  could  improve  the 
international mechanism for restructuring sufficiently so that the SDRM was unnecessary. A 
variant of this argument was that the SDRM was infeasible politically and that therefore 
CACs would have to do.  
To  that  argument,  proponents  of  the  SDRM  pointed  out  that  CACs  in  essence  bound 
creditors of any given asset (say, a particular bond issue) if the requisite majority voted in 
favour of accepting a debtor’s restructuring proposal, but did not bind across asset classes. 
Since there are invariably conflicts of interest between different classes (longer maturity 
holders want immediate acceleration of their issues, while those holding short-term debt do 
not; some are concerned with maintaining the face value of the principal while others would 
prefer to accept a reduction in face value and maintain a higher interest rate…), aggregation 
across classes can be a major difficulty. 
Why the proposal failed 
                                                            
21 In the SDRM debate, it was generally assumed that no sovereign would seek to restructure its debt unless 
debt is truly unsustainable. The restructuring by Ecuador in 2006, when debt was clearly sustainable, has called 
into question that assumption. See International Financial Law Review, September 2009, ‘Ecuador’s sovereign 
bond default’. 
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The SDRM proposal received enthusiastic support from many quarters: the vast majority of 
the votes of the IMF Board of Governors supported the proposal.
22 It was always recognised, 
however, that for the SDRM to become effective,  it would require not only passage by the 
Board  of  Governors  (by  85  percent  of  the  total  voting  power  or  more)  but  also  an 
amendment to the  IMF’s Articles of Agreement.
23 Some proponents failed to support the 
proposal enthusiastically in part because they be lieved that the proposal could never be 
passed by the requisite majority.  
In addition to doubts about feasibility, the issues raised above certainly reduced enthusiasm. 
Misinformation (such as the failure to recogni se the rigid link between fiscal and oth er 
reforms, the future primary surplus, and debt sustainability), concerns on the part of some 
developing countries that they might in future be refused sufficient IMF support and would 
have to restructure, belief that spreads might rise, and other factors   all contributed to 
doubts about the proposal. 
But the fact that the US effectively held veto power doomed the SDRM proposal once the US 
administration formally opposed it.
24 
As an alternative to the SDRM, the US authorities had supported the incorporation of CACs 
into bond covenants, and believed that they would be sufficient to address the issues the 
SDRM proposal sought to fix. Why the existence of CACs in individual bond issues would 
induce sovereigns to reduce delays before confronting their unsustainable debts was not 
explained. 
Lessons for the euro area 
The conflicts between interests of creditor and debtor countries are likely to arise in the 
euro area as they arose in the SDRM discussion. At their heart wi ll certainly lie the issue of 
how much say creditors have over the future course of the primary surplus (and therefore 
                                                            
22 Some opponents have argued that some, if not much, of that support was disingenuous in that it was always 
known that the United States would veto the proposal, and had the votes to do so. That the SDRM issue was 
raised repeatedly after the US rejection suggests, however, that much of the support was genuine. 
23 The desirability of an amendment was based on  keenness to have international law govern all countries’ 
issuance and ownership of sovereign debt instruments. 
24 President Bush’s first Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill supported the proposal, although it was soon 
recognised that the rest of the administration, and even other officials in the Treasury, were not supportive. It 
is unclear whether subsequent opposition to the SDRM was in response to the vehement objections of the 
private financial community or more based on the ‘market-unfriendly’ set of arguments. Probably both of 
those,  plus  the  lack  of  any  strong  supporters  within  the  administration  once  O’Neill  left,  were  significant 
contributing factors. 
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the degree of austerity in the initial years after restructuring). Agreeing on an appropriate 
mechanism for determining the ‘reasonable’ degree of adjustment relative to the necessary 
amount of restructuring as well as the magnitude and timing of financial assistance will be 
critical. What this consideration does imply for the euro area is that the procedures agreed 
upon for a European mechanism would need to include measures to insure the impartiality 
between creditors and debtors of the debt restructuring process.  
A second lesson, with hindsight, is that proponents of the SDRM assumed its benefits but 
were not sufficiently persuasive in the argument that there was money on the table for both 
creditors and debtors. In part, this was because the initial focus was more on the issues of 
market failures and vulture funds. But with hindsight it is clear that more effort should have 
been made to show the gains that might have been achieved with an SDRM mechanism. 
Persuading the policy community about the realities of over-indebtedness would be a crucial 
step in achieving an acceptable mechanism. 
A third, and important, lesson is that many participants in the discussion did not recognise 
that unsustainable debt is unsustainable, and that when this is the case restructuring is 
inevitable: the only question was how long the authorities would struggle with a heavy debt 
burden (with falling real GDP and other attendant costs) prior to taking action. 
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4  A European mechanism for sovereign-debt restructuring   
The previous sections argued that the euro area needs a mechanism for sovereign-debt 
resolution (section 2), and discussed efforts by the IMF to set up a global SDRM, which 
ended in failure (section 3). The relevant question now is whether the euro area can succeed 
where the IMF failed and manage to set up a regional SDRM. This question is really two-fold. 
First, one needs to examine whether a default could occur in the euro area, or whether it is a 
matter  only  for  developing  or  emerging  economies,  as  implicitly  envisaged  in  the  IMF 
proposal. Second, one must examine whether there are certain specificities in the European 
Union  in  general,  and  the  euro  area  in  particular,  that  may  facilitate  the  creation  of  a 
regional, as opposed to a global, sovereign-debt resolution mechanism.  
With respect to the first question, for the last 50 years or so all discussions on sovereign-
debt resolution implicitly or explicitly assumed that it is a subject only for developing or 
emerging market countries. Yet, as the Greek crisis has amply demonstrated, it is a matter 
that now confronts the European Union, and more specifically the euro area, where inflation 
is no option for solving severe indebtedness (see section 1). Besides, some of the members 
of the euro area have development levels (measured in terms of GDP per capita or financial 
sophistication) that are comparable to those of countries that have defaulted in the past 50 
years. Thus even assuming that only developing or emerging countries may resort to default 
(a questionable assumption), the euro area cannot consider itself naturally immune from 
risk. 
With respect to the second question, there are two specificities that clearly set the euro area 
apart  from  other  sets  of  countries.  The  first  is  that  euro-area  countries  belong  to  the 
European Union, which is a community of law. In order to achieve economic integration, the 
EU members have agreed on a large degree of policy coordination and to cooperate through 
supranational institutions within a common legal framework.  Participation in the EU entails 
the observance of the EU treaty and legislation, which has precedence over national law. 
Supranationality and partial loss of national sovereignty, the fears of which were a major 
reason for the rejection of the SDRM proposal, are therefore part and parcel of the existing 
EU. Within the union, monetary integration among the members of the euro area, which 
share  a  common  currency  issued  by  a  common  central  bank,  requires  even  closer 
cooperation, particularly with respect to fiscal policy coordination and discipline.  Since a 
debt  crisis  in  any  country  within  the  euro  area  risks  undermining  financial  stability  and 
thereby the common currency, an early and orderly resolution of the member’s financial 
difficulties should therefore be of direct interest to other members of the area. 
A second specificity arises from the very existence of the euro. As observed by Bini Smaghi 
(2010), debt in most emerging and developing country crises was usually essentially external 
and denominated in foreign currency (this is due to the inability of such countries to issue 
debt in their own currencies, as pointed out by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza, 2003).  18 
 
 
By contrast virtually all the public debt issued by euro-area countries is denominated in euro, 
and is mostly held by euro-area residents. Yet it is different from the domestic debt of 
countries owning their own currencies because more of it is held outside the issuing country 
and because the issuing country does not have full control over the currency in which the 
debt is denominated.    
Official  data  are  incomplete  but  existing  estimates  suggest  that  with  the  exception  of 
German and French central government debt securities, of which about half is held by non-
euro  area  residents,  the  bulk  of  euro-area  public  debt  is  held  either  within  the  issuing 
country or in other euro-area countries. For smaller euro-area countries holdings by other 
euro-area  residents  generally  dwarfs  domestic  holdings.  Financial  integration  within  the 
euro area has therefore created a new situation where debt is both ‘foreign’ and ‘domestic’.   
Linked to this situation is the fact that, in recent years, defaulting countries have usually 
been relatively small (in terms of GDP, the largest were Russia in 1991 and Brazil in 1983, 
which accounted for about 2 percent of world GDP) and their debt ratios were relatively low, 
because of lower thresholds of debt tolerance of emerging market countries (see Reinhart, 
Rogoff and Savastano 2003). Even when their external debts reached fairly large levels in 
global terms (the largest was the Brazilian external debt in 1983 which amounted to about 
0.9 percent of world GDP), emerging-market country defaults were relatively small financial 
events  for  individual  creditor  countries  because  their  debt  holdings  tend  to  be 
geographically dispersed.  
By  contrast,  euro-area  countries  are  relatively  large,  and  some  of  them  have  debts 
approaching or exceeding 100 percent of GDP and mostly foreign held. As a result the public 
debt of some euro-area countries is fairly high (around 4.2 percent of world GDP for Italy in 
2009,  and  1.3  percent  for  Spain),  and  mostly  their  holdings  are  concentrated  among 
residents  of  few  euro  partner  countries,  making  a  default  a  potentially  more  disturbing 
event. The default of any euro-area country except the very small ones would thus be large 
enough  to  threaten  the  solvency of  the  partner  countries’  financial  institutions,  thereby 
causing  governments  to  intervene  to  bail  out  creditor  banks  or  insurance  companies 
headquartered in their country. In other words, a poorly managed sovereign default of a 
euro-area country (or even the threat thereof, as was observed with the Greek crisis) could 
have resulted in a euro-area banking crisis, which would most likely have led to massive 
government support to prevent bank failure. One of the benefits of having a sovereign-debt 
resolution mechanism in place would precisely be to modify the behaviour of banks, and the 
financial sector in general, towards the holding of sovereign debt of dubious quality and 
therefore to limit the risk of bank failure and bail outs. 
Elements of a sovereign-debt restructuring mechanism for the euro area 19 
 
 
As already indicated, sovereign defaults are different from private defaults in a number of 
ways. The first is that, in contrast to a private company, the sovereign entity cannot be 
dissolved, a forced liquidation of its assets is impossible, and its creditors cannot assume 
ownership.  Since  the  economic  value  of  a  sovereign’s  main  asset  is  uncertain,  the 
declaration of bankruptcy in the classic sense - where the total liabilities exceed total assets - 
is  impossible.  This  implies  that  a  debt  restructuring  procedure,  if  it  exists,  can  only  be 
invoked when the sovereign debtor declares itself unable to pay its debt service (Kratzmann, 
1982).   
Second, while a private bankruptcy procedure primarily aims at maximising the value the 
creditors can extract from the defaulting institution, a defaulting sovereign must be left with 
the financial means to perform at least minimal functions of government. This implies that 
‘bankruptcy’  and  ‘insolvency’  are  misnomers  for  a  procedure  addressing  sovereign-debt 
crises. The only sensible goal of the procedure should be to restore the sustainability of the 
sovereign’s  public  finances,  which  is  in  the  interest  not  only  of  the  debtor  but  also  its 
creditors.  
Third,  under  democratic  government  or  a  community  of  democratic  states,  it  is 
inconceivable that a government be put under receivership, because this would contradict 
the nature of democracy. As argued above, the economic value of the government’s power 
to  tax  depends  on  the  quality  of  administration  and  the  loyalty  of  the  citizens.  Hence, 
imposing administrative oversight or heavy direct intervention into public affairs from the 
outside,  while  it  might  limit  the  national  administration’s  ability  to  misrepresent  tax 
revenues, could also destroy the value of the asset, as the national administration might be 
unwilling to cooperate and citizens might increasingly resist taxation.  
These differences imply that the instruments to deal with sovereign-debt crises in an orderly 
way are more limited than in the case of private debt, where the ultimate solution remains 
liquidating  the  borrower’s  assets  and,  in  the  case  of  corporations,  dissolving  the 
organisation. In the case of sovereign debt, a procedure must be found to restructure the 
debt in an orderly fashion through negotiations with the creditors. For the euro area, such a 
framework would have to have four main elements: 
  First, a formal way to initiate the debt-resolution procedure. Rules should be conducive 
to relatively early engagement of creditors and debtors in an exchange of information 
and views on the current situation in order to reduce the uncertainty of the creditors 
(Krueger,  2002).  Given  the  potentially  large  number  of  creditors/bondholders,  the 
initiative to start the procedure should come from the debtor government. With the 
opening  of  the  procedure,  the  country  would  immediately  stop  servicing  its  debt  to 
national  and  international  creditors  and  there  would  be  a  stay  on  all  litigation  by 
individual creditors seeking repayment.   20 
 
 
  Second, a mechanism to prevent a minority of bondholders from exploiting the majority 
by refusing to agree to a restructuring of the debt in the hope that the majority would 
buy them out. This requires that a super-majority of bondholders (say, two thirds) can 
outvote  the  minority  in  the  decision  to  enter  into  negotiations  and  to  conclude 
agreement with the debtor country regarding a restructuring of its debt. Furthermore, it 
requires that a stay can be imposed on all litigation against the debtor country to enforce 
the repayment of any parts of the debt to groups of creditors.  
  Third, a mechanism to conduct negotiations. In civil bankruptcy procedures, this is the 
role of the court-appointed trustee. In the context of sovereign default, the sheer size of 
the task implies that it would have to be assumed by a neutral, politically independent 
body.  
  Fourth, a rule for the provision of fresh credit from the EU or other euro-area member 
states to the government in financial distress. In the past, sovereign defaults have often 
been accompanied by periods during which the defaulting government no longer had 
access to credit markets. To help the government concerned over such a period would 
be a reasonable thing to do for the EU provided that a restructuring of the country’s debt 
has  occurred.  This  approach  would  prepare  the  way  for  a  combination  of  debt 
restructuring and debt crisis management   as recently proposed by the ECB (2010).
25 In 
fact, if economic solidarity is a mark of European Union, this combination would be a 
good way to combine solidarity with sound economics.    
Our proposal 
There are two approaches to the design of sovereign-debt restructuring procedures that are 
potentially consistent with the four elements just outlined. One is the ‘contractual’ approach 
which would encourage the inclusion of collective-action clauses (CACs) in sovereign-bond 
contracts. The other is the ‘statutory’ approach along the lines of the IMF’s SDRM proposal. 
                                                            
25 The ECB (2010) proposes a lender-of-last resort mechanism to support euro area member states in situations 
where they do not obtain access to private credit. However, the ECB does not provide much detail about this 
proposal. It would build on the EFSF and act as a lender of last resort for public borrowers. The ECB explicitly 
excludes the use of any funds coming from this agency to bail out private creditors. Bail-outs of euro-area 
countries should not be linked to an expulsion from the monetary union, because this would undermine the 
credibility of the common currency. Conditions for financial support should come at penalty rates. The ECB 
proposes to make financial support very unattractive for the recipient government and to extend it only under 
preferred creditor status and based on good collateral. Adopting a mechanism of this kind would amount to 
implementing a permanent bail-out framework. Markets could always anticipate that governments in financial 
distress receive assistance from the EU. Thus, the kind of market volatility observed in the first half of 2010 
would not arise.  Note, however, that the ECB’s request for preferred creditor status for the bail-out fund 
would be counterproductive, because private creditors would still face the possibility of losing their money. It 
would leave banks and investment funds with no guidance for their expectations regarding the solution of a 
fiscal crisis.  
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The  contractual  approach  has  obvious  advantages.  It  does  not  involve  supranational 
decisions and leaves negotiation on the terms of the agreement to the parties involved. It 
only requires, as a way to overcome the collective-action problem, a joint commitment to 
include CACs in bond issues, presumably at no visible cost. And it does not involve any 
detailed legislative work.  
Our view is, however, that the contractual approach is at least insufficient and perhaps even 
unsuited  to  the  European  case  because  it  is  intended  to  facilitate  the  negotiation  of  a 
settlement between a country and its private creditors whereas, as already discussed, the 
default of a euro-area country might raise concerns over financial stability in the euro area 
as a whole. This would necessarily lead the governments of the affected countries to step in, 
thereby transforming the negotiation between a country and its private creditors into a de- 
facto international negotiation involving states. In addition, the contractual approach has 
the disadvantage that it pertains only to individual bond classes. 
We  therefore  advocate  the  statutory  approach,  which  allows  aggregation  across  all 
creditors’  claims,  and  propose  the  creation  of  a  European  Crisis  Resolution  Mechanism 
(ECRM). While the creation of the IMF’s SDRM was rejected on the grounds that it would 
interfere with national sovereignty, this objection is much less valid at European level where 
states have agreed to share sovereignty within the framework of the EU’s community of law. 
In  order  to  fulfil  its  main  objective,  which  must  be  to  seek  a  restructuring  of  the  debt 
outstanding that restores the sustainability of the sovereign debtor - thereby making both 
private creditors and the sovereign debtor better off than in its absence - the design of the 
ECRM should be guided by a set of general principles consistent with the four principles 
outlined above:
26 
  The mechanism should only be used to restructure sovereign debt that is deemed to 
be  truly  unsustainable.  When  the  debt  of  a  country  has  been  judged  as 
unsustainable, the mechanism should create incentives for an early and collaborative 
resolution between debtor and creditors.  
  The mechanism should not interfere with the sovereignty of debtors. Its activation 
could only take place at the request of the sovereign debtor.    
  The mechanism should provide a framework establishing incentives for a negotiation 
between the debtor and its private creditors. In keeping with established procedures, 
claims of official bilateral creditors would be excluded from the mechanism and be 
subject to Paris Club restructuring; those of multilateral creditors would be excluded 
altogether from sovereign restructuring.
27   
                                                            
26 These principles are broadly similar to those envisaged for the IMF’s SDRM. See IMF (2002). 
27 During the SDRM episode there was a discussion  about whether the mechanism should apply not only to 
private but also to state creditors. The latter, however, strongly opposed such a possibility, preferring instead 
to retain their privileged treatment under the Paris Club.  22 
 
 
  The mechanism would allow a sovereign debtor to reach an agreement with all the 
creditors that are subject to the restructuring by making a settlement offer which, if 
approved by a qualified majority of all these creditors, would be binding on them all. 
The threshold for qualified majority and the procedures for settlement should be 
specified in the legal instrument establishing the ECRM. 
  Interference with contractual relations should be limited to those measures that are 
required to solve important collective-action problems.  
  The  integrity  of  the  decision-making  process  under  the  mechanism  should  be 
safeguarded by an efficient and impartial dispute-resolution system.  
These general principles suggest that the ECRM should involve three separate bodies: a legal 
one in charge of adjudication, an economic one to provide the necessary economic expertise 
and judgement, and a financial one dealing with financial assistance. 
The legal body would have the authority to open a debt-restructuring procedure upon the 
request of a euro-area sovereign borrower and upon approval by the economic body that 
the debtor’s debt is actually unsustainable. It would be a common judicial organ capable of 
sorting out and assessing claims by the parties, of ruling on disputes between creditors or 
between a creditor and the debtor, and of enforcing the decisions taken by the parties 
within the framework of the mechanism.  
After the formal opening of the procedure, the economic body would have the task of calling 
for meetings of the borrower and the lenders and of guiding the negotiations with a view to 
finding a solution which would be acceptable to both sides. To fulfil this task, it would have i) 
to be able to review the economic and financial accuracy of a borrower’s representation of 
its economic and financial situation and perspectives; ii) to evaluate the implications of any 
restructuring proposal for the borrower’s outstanding debt (ie the extent of the haircut) and 
its sustainable level of debt going forward (ie the projected future path of primary budgetary 
surpluses).  These  functions  require  not  only  extensive  information  and  economic  and 
financial competence. They also require that all parties trust that the judgment of this body 
be not only neutral but also ‘fair’ in the sense that it seeks the right balance between too 
much and too little leniency towards the debtor.  
The economic body would have the responsibility of assessing when a country is truly unable 
to meet its future financial obligations and by how much its debt needs to be reduced to 
solve that problem. There can be no simple test or rule for doing this, because a government 
can legally use its taxing powers to reduce citizens’ income and make room for servicing the 
debt.  However  there  are  economic  and  social  limits  to  the  corresponding  intra-  and 
intergenerational transfers.
28 Reliance on judgment will therefore be inevitable. But what is 
                                                            
28  This  trade-off  was  accurately  depicted  by  Jack  Boorman  (2003),  the  former  head  of  the  IMF’s  Policy 
Department, who wrote that: ‘Debt can almost always be serviced in some abstract sense, through additional 
taxation and through the diversion of yet more domestic production to exports to generate the revenue and 23 
 
 
crucial is that such judgments are coherent across time and countries and that they are 
based on sound principles, above all on an evaluation of the level of primary budgetary 
surpluses that the country can generate in the future.  
The financial body would have the tasks of providing short- or medium-term financing to the 
debtor  country  on  behalf  of  the  EU  to  enable  it  to  undertake  the  necessary  economic 
adjustment towards fiscal sustainability. Lending conditions should include a risk premium 
but not a penalty, in other words lending should be at rates charged by financial markets for 
governments  with  debt  levels  similar  to  those  of  the  country  in  question  after  its 
restructuring.  
 
The roles of the economic and the financial body are necessarily interlinked, although it is 
hard to say generally how closely. The critical question is: can an agreement between a 
borrower and its lenders be found without knowing the amount of financial assistance the 
former  will  receive  afterwards?  If  so,  the  economic  body  can  concentrate  fully  on  the 
settlement between the borrower and the lenders and the financial body can subsequently 
negotiate  the  amount  and  terms  of  financial  assistance  with  the  borrower.  If  not,  the 
amount of assistance must be determined by the economic body as part of the settlement 
process and this will give the bondholders incentives to hold out and force the economic 
body to make financial concessions to reach a settlement. This risk is likely to be a significant 
one. To mitigate it, any new lending under financial assistance should be given seniority over 
previous debt; also, the economic body should be able to provide an objective assessment of 
the financing needs, which calls for making it independent of the governments of the euro- 
area member states.          
Various institutional arrangements can be conceived as regards the assignment of the legal, 
economic and financing functions of crisis resolution but, whatever the arrangement, these 
three  roles  should  be  fulfilled  and  distinguished  in  order  to  avoid  creating  conflicts  of 
interest.  
Our suggestion is that the legal role would be assigned to the European Court of Justice, 
whose mission is to ensure that ‘the law is observed’ in the interpretation and application of 
European treaties, to a specialised chamber within the court or, if preferred, to an entirely 
new institution.  
The economic role should be given to an independent institution capable of providing the 
required assessment and of keeping a stance throughout the negotiations between creditors 
and debtor if the extent of the assistance becomes an argument in negotiations. This role 
should in our view accrue to the European Commission or to the European Commission 
jointly with the ECB.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
foreign exchange needed to service the debt. But there is a political and social, and perhaps moral, threshold 
beyond which policies to force these results become unacceptable.’ 24 
 
 
Finally, the natural choice for financial assistance would be the European Financial Stability 
Facility (EFSF), the new body set up and owned by the euro-area member states (Box 1).  
Box 1. The EFSF 
The EFSF is a special-purpose vehicle agreed to by the 16 euro-area member states on 9-10 
May 2010 and designed to preserve financial stability in the euro area by providing financial 
assistance to member states in financial difficulty. It was established as a limited-liability 
company under Luxembourg law in June 2010. It is an intergovernmental body whose board 
comprises  representatives  of  each  of  the  16  euro-area  member  states.  The  European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (ECB) can each appoint an observer to the EFSF 
Board.  
The Facility has been operational since August 2010 and is able to issue bonds, notes or 
other debt instruments on the market backed by guarantees of €440 billion provided by the 
euro-area countries on a pro-rata basis, in accordance with their share in the paid-up capital 
of the ECB. Lending by the EFSF to member states in difficulty is subject to conditions to be 
negotiated with the European Commission in liaison with the ECB and the IMF and to be 
approved by the Eurogroup, the grouping of the euro-area finance ministers founded in 
1997 and formally recognised by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. 
The EFSF is explicitly temporary. It can only facilitate the financing of loans agreed on or 
prior to 30 June 2013. The EFSF is to be liquidated at the earliest date after this deadline on 
which it no longer has any loans outstanding and all funding instruments as well as any 
reimbursement amounts due to the guarantor states have been repaid in full.   
It  should  be  emphasised,  however,  that  financial  support  for  the  ECRM  could  only  be 
extended by the EFSF if it acquired the status of a permanent European agency, whose 
membership could be limited to euro-area members or open to other EU countries as well. 
Indeed, as long as it remains a private company, loans by the EFSF to euro-area countries 
would have to be restructured in the same way as claims of any other private creditor if a 
country were to default. Similarly, existing loans by euro-area countries to Greece would 
have to be restructured under Paris Club procedures were the country to default. The only 
way to ensure full protection for EFSF claims on debtor governments would be to turn it into 
a European agency that would therefore enjoy seniority rights.
29    
How the ECRM would work 
                                                            
29 Two models could be considered in this respect: either an independent institution akin to the ECB, or an 
agency whose governance would involve national governments like the EIB. As its role would be to provide 
temporary financial assistance with the guarantee of European governments, the second option would be 
more natural. In both cases procedures for decision-making would need to be agreed on. There is a strong case 
for not retaining the unanimity requirement of the current EFSF as it could severely hamper the institution’s 
ability to act in the event of a crisis. 25 
 
 
As discussed in the third part of this paper, the design of a crisis-resolution mechanism 
involves a series of delicate issues. We now turn to discussing how they would be addressed 
under our proposal.    
One  question  about  the  ECRM  is  whether  the  EFSF  should  issue  ‘Brady  bonds’  for 
governments whose debt has been restructured. That is, should the EFSF offer collateral for 
the  principal  amounts  of  new  bonds  issued  by  these  governments, where  the  collateral 
would take the form of a zero-coupon bond issued by the EFSF and guaranteed by the EU or 
by the group of euro-area member states collectively? The main function of Brady bonds is 
to  regain  credit-market  access  for  governments  where  the  sustainability  of  their  public 
finances is not firmly established. The holder of a Brady bond essentially obtains insurance 
for the principal amount of his loan against the risk that the borrower might default again. 
This implies that a debt-resolution mechanism that works efficiently has no need for Brady 
bonds.  At  the  same  time,  the  availability  of  such  insurance  might  create  incentives  for 
incumbent  bond  holders  to  gamble  in  the  restructuring  negotiations,  ie  to  insist  on 
restructuring conditions which do not return the borrower to a state of sustainable public 
finances and to hope that good fortune will helping the borrower to repay its debt. This 
possibility of adverse incentives suggests that the ECRM should not involve Brady bonds. 
A second question concerns the scope of lending activity by the permanent EFSF. In our view, 
financial assistance by the EFSF need not be restricted to lending to governments whose 
debt, having been deemed unsustainable, is restructured.  In other words, there should be 
no automaticity between EFSF lending and restructuring. Access to EFSF lending should, 
under appropriate conditions (ie an economic adjustment programme and commitment by 
private banks to maintain exposure vis-à-vis the country), be open to a euro-area country 
that is willing and able to service its debt in full but is facing temporary liquidity problems. 
However, if the economic  adjustment  programme  proved insufficient for the country to 
return to debt sustainability, restructuring of private-sector debt should proceed as swiftly 
as possible.  
A third question is whether and how the IMF should be involved. Since it contributes to 
financial assistance to euro-area countries and plays an important role in assessing their 
public finances, involvement of the IMF with its expertise, negotiating capacity and financial 
resources would be natural. On the other hand the IMF is a global institution whose formal 
participation  in  a  European  debt-restructuring  mechanism,  which  would  have  financial 
consequences for non-European creditors, would risk creating legal and political difficulties. 
For  this  reason  the  IMF  should  be  consulted  throughout  the  process  but  its  formal 
participation should not, in our view, be a requirement.     
A fourth question is to whom debt restructuring would apply. Fairness and efficiency call for 
making all creditors and all debt instruments liable to restructuring. The provisions of  a 26 
 
 
future ECRM treaty would apply to all debt issued (or contracted) by a euro-area sovereign,
30 
regardless of whether or not it is issued in euro or inside the euro area and whether it is held 
by euro-area residents or non-residents. This means that, although possibly issued outside 
the euro area and governed by foreign law, all disputes concerning euro-area sovereign debt 
would be adjudicated, in the event the ECRM is activated, by the judicial organ designated 
by the treaty. In addition, contrary to the usual practice of sovereign debtors to discriminate 
between domestic and foreign creditors, the ECRM would not make such  a distinction, for 
two reasons. First, discrimination between domestic and foreign creditors would not be 
acceptable among members of the European Union. Second, the main justification for the 
difference of treatment  - that domestic creditors are normally paid in domestic currency 
while foreign creditors are normally paid in foreign currency - does not hold in the euro area, 
since the euro is both the domestic currency of each country and the currency of many 
foreign creditors. 
To be clear, the ECRM treaty would provide that all contracts entered into by a state that is a 
party to the treaty would be subject to the provisions of the t reaty, notwithstanding any 
clause to the contrary. The treaty would thus become an element of the law governing the 
contract, whatever this law is (i e  the law of the debtor state, or of another euro -area 
member, or of a non -euro-area country). Consequently, any activation of the mechanism 
would operate as if the contract included a collective -action clause, the terms of which 
would be those defined by the treaty. A foreign judge (eg in a US or UK court) who would be 
prepared to enforce a CAC as a contractual clause would also recognise the applicability of 
the treaty provisions (and the binding effect of decisions made under these provisions) as 
part of the law governing the contract. 
A fifth and final question is what should be the  legal format of the proposed reform. The 
ECRM could be established either through an EU directive or through the enactment of a 
treaty among the euro-area countries. The second solution has the disadvantage of being 
more  cumbersome  politically,  but  would  nonetheless  be  preferable  in  our  view  to  the 
alternative  of  enacting  uniform  national  laws  in  all  euro-area  countries  through  an  EU 
directive,  which  would  increase  the  risk  of  discrepancies  not  only  in  the  formulation  of 
applicable  rules  among  the  participating  countries  but  also  in  their  interpretation  and 
enforcement by the common judicial body. Adoption of a treaty does not imply, however, 
that enactment of some or all of the provisions in national laws could entirely be dispensed 
with. Such enactment would in fact remain necessary for those treaty provisions that may 
have  to  be  invoked  in  national  courts,  in  countries  whose  legal  systems  preclude  the 
enforcement of treaty provisions that have not been incorporated in the country’s domestic 
laws. 
                                                            
30 The provisions of the treaty would only apply to debt issued (or contracted) by national governments since 
sub-national entities would not be parties to the treaty.  27 
 
 
Financial regulation and market implications 
The recent debt crisis has shown that there might be an important link between sovereign 
default and a bank crisis. Banks in the euro area, both inside and outside the country in 
distress, that hold large amounts of bonds issued by the defaulting country in their portfolios 
might lose access to the ECB’s refinancing facilities and face severe liquidity shortages as a 
result of a default. Some observers have suggested that Greece was bailed out because the 
French and the German governments wanted to make sure that banks in their countries 
would not be destabilised by a collapse in the value of Greek government bonds. 
It is important to recognise, first, that this is a transitional issue, although admittedly the 
transition  phase  might  be  long.  Before  the  Greek  crisis,  banks  in  Germany,  France  and 
elsewhere bought and exposed themselves massively to Greek debt because they assumed 
that Greek debt, like other euro-area public debt, was essentially risk-free. This assumption 
was  justified  under  pre-monetary  union  circumstances,  when  governments  could  print 
money to pay off their debts, but is no longer the case. Once banks have become familiar 
with the new regime and adjusted to it, they will limit their exposure to debt issued by 
countries that are at risk of default. As a result, the holders of the debt of such countries will 
demand  an  interest  premium  for  the  lack  of  liquidity  of  such  bonds,  thus  rewarding 
governments  that  keep  the  risk  of  default  low.  This  will  be  another  element  of  market 
discipline strengthening the incentives for prudent fiscal policy.    
This last point implies that the creation of a debt resolution mechanism in the euro area has 
important ramifications for financial market regulation. It implies that there is no longer a 
justification for special treatment of public debt in bank capital and liquidity requirements. 
Consistency of financial market policies, therefore, demands that banks be required to hold 
capital against public debt and that a mechanism of ‘prompt corrective action’ be put in 
place whereby banking supervisors impose progressive penalties against banks that exhibit 
deteriorating capital ratios. By the same token, the uneven quality of public debt will have to 
be recognised by the ECB when assessing the quality of the collateral posted by commercial 
banks. Regulatory changes along these lines would have two desirable effects:  
  First, in the event of a debt crisis, such a mechanism would go a long way towards 
limiting the ability of banks to delay a sovereign-debt restructuring in the hope that 
the EFSF will have no choice but to bail them out.  
  Second, in the steady state, banks and other institutions would know that, in the 
future, they may take substantial losses from holding government debt and providing 
loans to governments. Knowing that government debt is risky, banks and financial 
markets would price it more realistically and assure that they will not be exposed to 28 
 
 
it excessively. This, in turn, would expose debt-issuing governments to market signals 
and give them stronger incentives to refrain from excessive debt accumulation.
31 
The financial crisis that began in 2007 and blew full force in September 2008 has already led 
to much larger differences in bond yields in the euro -area bond market than before. While 
yield differentials existed before and did respond to the fiscal performance of the member 
states,  these  differentials  have  become  much  larger  and  much  more  responsive  to 
differences in debts and deficits than before the crisis.
32  
An  important  question  is:  what  would  the  creation  of  a  sovereign -debt  resolution 
mechanism do to bond yields in the euro area? Would it risk making all debt more costly, as 
sometimes suggested? Empirical evidence shedding light on this question is hard to come by. 
Bradley et al. (2008) find that bond yields respond significantly to changes in legal rules 
affecting the uncertainty about repayment. From the perspective of an individual investor, 
however, it is not clear whether the introduction of a debt -resolution mechanism increases 
or reduces the uncertainty about repayment. This may explain why Bradley et al. do not find 
significant effects on bond yields as a result of  the widespread introduction of collective-
action clauses in emerging market bonds after 2003. Eichengreen and Mody (2004) compare 
the yield on bonds with and without collective -action clauses. They find that low -quality 
borrowers pay higher interest rates if they issue bonds with collective-action clauses than if 
they issue bonds without them. On the other hand,  high-quality borrowers pay lower 
interest rates if they issue bonds with collective action clauses that if they issue bonds 
without them.   
If anything, this evidence suggests that the introduction of rules for dealing with sovereign 
default will contribute to the tendency of markets to distinguish between high and low 
quality borrowers and to price loans and bonds accordingly. This would strengthen market 
discipline and contribute to the goal of sustainable public finances laid down in the European 
Treaty, and thereby to the sustainability of the euro itself. 
   
                                                            
31 The mechanism would also be fully compatible with a dual debt regime along the lines of the Blue Bonds 
proposal of Delpla and von Weizsäcker (2010).   
32 See Schuknecht, Wolswijk and von Hagen (2009, 2010). 29 
 
 
5  Conclusion 
We have argued that the current architecture of European Monetary Union, which rests on 
the flawed assumption that sovereign-debt crises cannot happen, is incomplete and that 
EMU needs a crisis resolution mechanism – an ECRM.   
Our proposal for such a mechanism draws on the lessons from international experience and 
builds on the response to the Greek crisis in spring 2010, especially the creation by the EU 
jointly with the IMF of a facility for temporary financial assistance to euro-area countries. As 
far as possible, we have sought to base our proposal on existing institutions and practices in 
order to limit the legal, institutional and financial implications of the creation of a crisis- 
resolution mechanism.  
Difficulties currently abound and must be addressed head-on in order to avoid potentially 
damaging  ambiguities  and  perverse  incentives.  For  this  reason,  European  governments 
should not let the understandable reluctance to revise the European Treaty stand in the way 
of  the  urgent  need  to  build  a  sound  institutional  framework  for  the  euro.  We  find  it 
especially  important  to  distinguish  between  the  different  legal,  economic,  and  financial 
assistance roles involved in any crisis resolution and to invest these roles with the proper 
responsibility.  
In creating such a mechanism, Europe is taking the lead where the international community 
failed to find agreement a decade ago. There are good reasons to think it has a fair chance to 
succeed, and we do not share the view of those who claim that no European solution can be 
found in the absence of a global solution. By the same token, however, we certainly consider 
that  there  would  be  significant  benefits  in  the  definition  of  a  global  response  to  the 
sovereign crisis-resolution issue, and we hope that Europe’s decision to create a regional 
mechanism will help advance the global discussion.    
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